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TORT LAW-The Doctrine of Independent Intervening
Cause Does Not Apply in Cases of Multiple Acts of
Negligence-Torres v. El Paso Electric Company
I. INTRODUCTION
In Torres v. El Paso Electric Company,' the New Mexico Supreme Court
abolished the doctrine of independent intervening cause for multiple acts of
negligence, including where a defendant and a plaintiff are both negligent.2 An
independent intervening cause is "a cause which interrupts the natural sequence of
events, turns aside their cause, prevents the natural and probable results of the
original act or omission, and produces a different result, that could not have been
reasonably foreseen."3 The Torrescourt concluded that the independent intervening
cause instruction would "unduly emphasize" a defendant's attempts to shift fault
and was "sufficiently repetitive" of that for proximate cause that any "potential for
jury confusion and misdirection outweigh[ed] its usefulness."4 As a result, the
Torres court held that in cases involving multiple acts of negligence, trial courts
should not give the independent intervening cause instruction or include a reference
to it in the proximate cause instruction.5 The decision is the most recent in a series
of New Mexico cases that have reexamined prior procedural and substantive
doctrines in light of the switch from contributory to comparative negligence and
from joint and several liability to several liability.
This note describes the Torrescase in part H, describes the legal background for
the case in part HI, examines the court's reasoning in eliminating independent
intervening cause in part IV, analyzes the court's ruling in the context of current tort
law in part V, and discusses Torres' implications with respect to future rulings on
the effect of comparative negligence on other tort doctrines in New Mexico in part
VI.
I1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Francisco Torres, an employee of Aldershot of New Mexico, Inc., was assisting
in the installation of a greenhouse roof when he touched a high voltage conductor
on an adjacent power pole with a long metal rod handed to him by a coworker.6
Torres was standing at the edge of the roof when he came in contact with the power
line. As a result of the electrical shock, he fell to the ground outside the greenhouse
and suffered serious injuries.
Francisco Torres and his wife Sonia filed a personal injury action in state district
court alleging negligence by El Paso Electric Company. Torres alleged that the pole,
which El Paso Electric had installed, was bent and that at the time of installation
was leaned toward the greenhouse to offset the weight of the electrical conductor
attached to the pole. After the company installed the pole, it shifted several feet

1. 127 N.M. 729,987 P.2d 386 (1999).

2. See id. at 737-38, 987 P.2d at 394-95.
3. Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400,411-12, 285 P.2d 507,514 (1955).
4. Torres, 127 N.M. at 737-38, 987 P.2d at 394-95.

5. See id.
6. Unless otherwise noted, all facts in this section are from Tortes, 127 N.M. at 732-34,987 P.2d at 389-

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

towards the greenhouse, twisted and cracked, and the cross-arm of the pole tilted
down toward the greenhouse.

In his complaint, Torres alleged that although several individuals had warned El
Paso Electric about the condition of the pole, and the line's proximity to the
greenhouse, the company took no action to alleviate the problem. El Paso Electric
claimed that the negligence of Torres, Aldershot, and Aldershot's contractors
superseded any negligence by the company and constituted independent intervening
causes, which relieved it of liability.
At trial, the court instructed the jury on the affirmative defense of independent
intervening causes, over Torres' objections. The jury returned a special verdict
finding El Paso Electric Company negligent, but finding that the company's
negligence had not proximately caused Torres's injuries.' On appeal, the court of
appeals recognized a potential conflict between the defense of independent
intervening cause and New Mexico's adoption of comparative negligence.
Therefore, it certified the case to the New Mexico Supreme Court and asked it to

decide "the continuing viability of the independent intervening cause [jury]
instructions and, if viable, the circumstances in which they should be given...

The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted the certification.9
Ill.

BACKGROUND

A. Independent Intervening Cause
The concept of independent intervening cause has been an integral part of the
doctrine of proximate cause, and has traditionally been included in the definition
of proximate cause.'" In Thompson v. Anderman," the court stated "[tihe proximate

cause of an injury is that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any new, independent cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred."' 2 As a result, intervening cause has been discussed in the

7. The trial court issued directed verdicts in favor of El Paso Electric on the other claims submitted, those
of intentional spoliation of evidence and punitive damages. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 732, 987 P.2d at 389. The New
Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the directed verdict on intentional spoliation of evidence, stating that Torres failed
to demonstrate a malicious intent to disrupt his lawsuit. See id. The Torres court reversed the trial court's directed
verdict on punitive damages on the basis that cumulative actions by El Paso Electric Company gave rise to a
reasonable inference of recklessness in the management of an inherently dangerous activity and that the issue
should not have been removed from the jury. See id at 743-44, 987 P.2d at 400-01. A further analysis of these
additional rulings is beyond the scope of this Note.
8. Id. at 733, 987 P.2d at 390. The New Mexico Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction in matters
appealed to, but undecided by, the New Mexico Court of Appeals, if the court of appeals certifies that the matter
involves: (1) a significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United States, or (2) an
issue of substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-514(C) (1996). The certification process is governed by the New Mexico Rules of Appellate Procedure. See N.M.
R. App. P. 12-606-608. In this case, the court of appeals certified the issue as a matter of substantial public
importance. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 733, 987 P.2d at 390.
9. See id. at 733, 987 P.2d at 390.
10. See, e.g., Thompson v. Anderman, 59 N.M. 400, 411, 285 P.2d 507, 514 (1955) (citing Mastas v.
Alameda Cattle Co., 36 N.M. 323, 326, 14 P.2d 733, 735 (1932), and Silva v.Waldie, 42 N.M. 514,518, 82 P.2d
282, 285 (1938)).
11. 59 N.M. 400, 285 P.2d 507 (1955).
12. Id. at 411, 285 P.2d at 514 (emphasis added).

Spring 2000]

TORRES V. EL PASO ELECTRIC COMPANY

context of proximate cause. For example, in Reif v. Morrison,3 the defendant

placed poisoned feed on a neighbor's land. The neighbor subsequently rented the
land for pasture, and the cattle put on the land were killed by eating the poisoned

feed. In his defense, the defendant relied on the renting of the land and placement

of cattle on it as an intervening cause absolving him of negligence. 4 The court held
that the defendant could reasonably have anticipated the placement of cattle on the
land, therefore, it was not an intervening cause. 5 Thus, as explained by the court
in Thompson, "[tihe concurrent or succeeding negligence of a third person which
does not break the sequence of events is not [an independent intervening cause], and
constitutes no defense for the original wrongdoer ....16
New Mexico cases that have considered independent intervening cause illustrate
7
the key elements of the doctrine: (1) generally a subsequent negligence,' (2)
breaking the chain of events, and (3) creating an unforeseen result.' In Latimer v.
City of Clovis, 9 where a boy drowned in the city's swimming pool, the court found
that whether the mother's or playmates' actions just prior to the drowning

constituted independent intervening causes to the city's lack of maintenance of the
pool area was a factual issue for the jury." In another case, the court found that a
grain processor's mixing of grain treated for planting that was toxic with feed

supplies was foreseeable, and thus not an independent intervening cause relieving
22
the manufacturer of its duty to warn. 2 Similarly, in Richardsv. Upjohn Company,
a physician's misuse of a drug was foreseeable and not an independent intervening
cause insulating Upjohn from liability.'
New Mexico courts have also considered independent intervening cause
instructions in cases involving successive automobile accidents.' However, the

13. 44 N.M. 201, 100 P.2d 229 (1940).
14. See id. at 203-05, 100 P.2d at 230-31.
15. See id at 206-07, 100 P.2d at 232-33. Other early cases illustrate the concept as well. See Valdez v.
Gonzales, 50 N.M. 281,293, 176 P.2d 173,180-81 (1946) (finding that defendant state officials who sent incorrect
instructions to election officials resulting in ballots being late was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's election
loss); Gilbert v. New Mexico Constr. Co., 39 N.M. 216, 219,44 P.2d 489, 490-91 (1935) (finding that the breaking
of a water main, not the "intervening negligence of the city" in not restoring water pressure to firemen fighting a
fire, was the proximate cause of fire loss); Maestas v. Alameda Cattle Co., 36 N.M. 323, 326, 14 P.2d 733, 735
(1932) (finding that the lack of a guard on a pump jack, not the gust of wind that caused the plaintiff to slip and
fall against it, was the proximate cause of plaintiff's resulting injuries); Lutz v. Atl. & Pac. R.R. Co., 6 N.M. 496,
510, 30 P. 912,916-17 (1892) (finding that the negligence of employees on the train that hit the caboose in which
the plaintiff was riding, not the failure of the company to furnish a caboose with proper end doors and windows,
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's death).
16. Thompson, 59 N.M. at 411-12, 285 P.2d at 514 (citations omitted).
17. See N.M. UJ.I. Cv. 13-306 cmt.
18. See Thompson, 59 N.M. at 411-12, 285 P.2d at 514.
19. 83 N.M. 610,495 P.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1972).
20. See id. at 618,495 P.2d at 796.
21. See First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque v. Nor-Am Agric. Prods., Inc., 88 N.M. 74,82,537 P.2d 682,690
(CL App. 1975).
22. 95 N.M. 675,625 P.2d 1192 (Ct. App. 1980).

23. See id. at 681,625 P.2d at 1196-98.

24. See Barbieri v. Jennings. 90 N.M. 83. 86. 559 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct. App. 1976) (allowing the

independent intervening cause instruction in order to determine the factual issue of whether the negligence of

another driver was concurrent); Griego v. Marquez, 89 N.M. 11, 14,546 P.2d 859, 862 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding

that the jury should determine whether the negligence of the driver in the first accident was the proximate cause

of plaintiff's injuries when the plaintiff was hit by a second car while inspecting damage from the first accident);
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New Mexico Court of Appeals has noted that the definitions of proximate cause and
independent intervening cause are "difficult to understand and apply in second
accident cases. 25 The court agreed with the First Circuit that the jury needs to
determine whether the potentially bizarre unfolding of events between the culpable
act and the injury, though impossible to predict, are sufficiently close to hold the
initial wrongdoer liable.26 Even in a single accident case; the court of appeals had
earlier suggested that submission of the independent intervening cause instruction
could be misleading and confusing to the jury."'
In many cases, the defense of intervening cause was a contention made along
with the contention that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent.' In Thompson
v. Anderman, the defendant contended that a minor plaintiff who ran across a street
without looking after being discharged from a bus at a particular location was an
independent intervening cause and contributorily negligent." The court found that
the bus driver's act of discharging the plaintiff from the bus was the proximate
cause of the injuries the plaintiff sustained when he ran into a truck in traffic."° In
another case, regarding a sign turned sideways at the intersection where a collision
occurred, the defendant asserted that the plaintiff's action constituted both
contributory negligence and an independent intervening cause. The court of appeals
found the independent intervening cause instruction should not have been submitted
to the jury because the defendant did not look in the direction of the sign and
therefore presented no evidence that any act broke the natural sequence of events
causing the accident.3' In Little v. Price,32 the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's
construction of a dam on the defendant's land constituted contributory negligence
and an independent intervening cause to the defendant's negligent maintenance of
the dam.33 Finally, a plaintiff's suicide while under custodial care has been
considered under both independent intervening cause and contributory negligence

Kelly v. Montoya, 81 N.M. 591,595,470 P.2d 563, 567 (Ct App. 1970) (holding that it was a matter for the jury
to determine whether the second accident was an independent intervening cause where the driver hit a car stopped
because of the first accident); see also Archuleta v. Johnston, 83 N.M. 380, 381-82, 492 P.2d 997, 998-99 (Ct.
App. 1971) (holding that where the plaintiff had an unobstructed view of slow-traveling vehicles, there was
evidence to support the theory that the plaintiffs failure to avoid a collision was an independent intervening cause).
Independent intervening cause has also been a consideration in successive injury cases. See Powers v. Riccobene
Masonry Constr., Inc., 97 N.M. 20,27,636 P.2d 291,298 (Ct. App. 1980); Perea v. Gorby, 94 N.M. 330-32, 610
P.2d 212, 217-19 (Ct. App. 1980).
25. Griego, 89 N.M. at 14,546 P.2d at 862.
26. Seeid. at 13, 546 P.2d at 861.
27. SeeWilliams v. Cobb, 90 N.M. 638, 643, 567 P.2d 487, 492 (Ct. App. 1977), overruled on other
grounds by Trujillo v. Baldonado, 95 N.M. 321, 323, 621 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Ct. App. 1980).
28. Under contributory negligence, where the plaintiffs injury is brought about by not just the defendant's
negligence but also by the plaintiff's negligence, the defendant is relieved completely of liability according to the

common law. See Joseph Goldberg, JudicialAdoptionof ComparativeFaultin New Mexico: The Time is at Hand,
10 N.M. L. REv. 3 (1979).
29. See Thompson, 59 N.M. at 411-13, 285 P.2d at 514-15.
30. See id at 413, 285 P.2d at 515.
31. See Williams, 90 N.M. at 643,567 P.2d at 492.
32. 74 N.M. 626, 397 P.2d 15 (1964).
33. See id. at 628-29, 397 P.2d at 17-18.
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theories in New Mexico.' The dual contentions in these cases suggest a possible
overlap of the role of independent intervening cause with that of contributory
negligence. Because either defense, if proven, resulted in defeat for a plaintiff, it
was not necessary to distinguish them. Subsequent to these cases, New Mexico
replaced contributory negligence with comparative negligence. The result was that
if comparative negligence were applicable, a plaintiff would still recover a reduced
amount, but if the negligence was an independent intervening cause, the plaintiff
recovered nothing. This, in turn, required a reexamination of the relationship of
independent intervening cause with comparative negligence in cases where the
plaintiff's conduct constituted negligence. The advent of comparative negligence
and several liability required reexamination of many of our tort doctrines, to test
their compatibility with comparative negligence and several liability.
B. Comparative Negligence and Several Liability
Although New Mexico historically embraced the common-law doctrine of
contributory negligence, it recognized that it was an "all-or-nothing" doctrine that
could result in substantial injustices by barring a plaintiff from recovering
anything.35 Because of the harshness of the doctrine, New Mexico took steps to
alleviate its harshness through judicial adoption of ameliorative common-law
doctrines36 and statutory doctrines." For instance, the legislature enacted a statute
that stated that the failure of a blind pedestrian to carry a cane or use a guide dog
3
would not constitute nor be evidence of contributory negligence. " The harshness
associated with employee contributory negligence was lessened when the state
passed the Worker's Compensation Act39 and the New Mexico Disease Disablement
Law.' These laws disallowed any defense that an employee assumed risk or did not
exercise ordinary care in actions where the employee was injured in the line of duty
or sustained occupational disease.4 '
Finally, in 1981, the New Mexico Supreme Court, adopting an opinion by the
court of appeals, eliminated contributory negligence, replacing it with comparative
negligence.42 The court adopted the pure form of comparative negligence where the3
4
jury apportions fault, regardless of degree, between the plaintiff and defendant.
34. See City of Belen v. Harrell, 93 N.M. 601,604,603 P.2d 711,714 (1979) (finding that the trial court
erredin refusing to instruct the jury on whether plaintiff decedent's actions constituted an independent intervening

cause or contributory negligence).
35. See Syroid v. Albuquerque Gravel Prods. Co., 86 N.M. 235, 237,522 P.2d 570, 572 (1974) (retaining
contributory negligence in a three-to-two decision).
36. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 683-84, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239-40 (1981) (discussing the potential
impact of New Mexico's adoption of comparative negligence on various tort doctrines).
37. See id at 686, 634 P.2d at 1238.
38. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-7-4 (1996).
39. See id. § 52-1-8 (1991).
40. See Id. § 52-3-7.
41. See id §§ 52-1-8, 52-3-7; see also id. § 63-3-23 (1999) (disallowing the application of contributory
negligence where a railroad employee is injured through a reported defect). The New Mexico legislature also
alleviated the harshness of common law joint and several liability. For instance, the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act gave joint tortfeasors the right to contribution from other tortfeasors. See id § 41-3-1 to -8 (1996).
42. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 683,634 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1981).
43. See id. at 689-90,634 P.2d at 1241-42. The pure form of comparative negligence apportions liability
in direct proportion to fault in all cases. See U v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (Cal. 1975)
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Because of the balance created by comparative negligence, the court held that "rules
designed to ameliorate the harshness of the contributory negligence rule are no
longer needed."" In addition, the court stated that "negligence ... and other liability
concepts based on or related to negligence of either plaintiff, defendant, or both, are
subject to the comparative negligence rule."' 5
Shortly after the adoption of comparative negligence, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals also abolished joint and several liability for concurrent tortfeasors and
adopted several liability in its place." In Bartlettv. New Mexico Welding Supply,
Inc.,"7 the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that in multi-tortfeasor cases a
concurrent tortfeasor was no longer liable for the entire damage resulting from his
negligence.48 The court reasoned that the potential grounds for retaining joint and
several liability could not be justified. First, it determined that the concept of one
indivisible wrong is obsolete and is not to be applied in comparative negligence
cases.49 The court was unwilling to say that causation could not be apportioned
along with fault.' Second, the court concluded that plaintiffs should not be favored
by bearing no risk of non-recovery against an insolvent defendant in multi-tortfeasor
cases and stated that "[flairness dictates that the blameworthiness of all actors in an
incident be treated on a consistent basis."'" The court also held that it is proper for
the jury to consider all tortfeasors, including non-parties, in apportioning fault.52
After Bartlett, the New Mexico Legislature codified several liability for joint
tortfeasors whose conduct proximately caused a plaintiff's injury.53
The adoption of comparative negligence and abolition of joint and several
liability in New Mexico has compelled reconsideration of associated tort doctrines.
The result is that some have been abolished, some have been retained, and some
have been modified. Others have not yet undergone reconsideration, but eventually
will be similarly evaluated. The treatment is generally based on the extent to which
(adopting the pure form of comparative negligence for the State of California). A second basic form of comparative
negligence, of which there are several variants, applies apportionment based on fault up to the point at which the
plaintiff s negligence is equal to or greater than that of the defendant-when that point is reached, plaintiff is barred
from recovery. See id. A third, infrequently used form called "slight/gross" allows a plaintiff to recover damages
diminished in accordance with his fault if his fault is slight and the defendant's is gross. See Goldberg, supra note
28, at 10-11.
44. Scott, 96 N.M. at 687,634 P.2d at 1239.
45. Id
46. See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 98 N.M. 152, 158-59, 646 P.2d 579, 585-86 (Ct.
App. 1982).
47. 98 N.M. 152, 646 P.2d 579 (Ct. App. 1982).
48. See id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586.
49. See id. at 158, 646 P.2d at 585.
50. See id.
51. Id
52. See id. at 159, 646 P.2d at 586. Following Bartlett, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act no longer held any force in New Mexico with respect to contribution
among concurrent tortfeasors. See Wilson v. Gait, 100 N.M. 227, 231, 668 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Ct. App. 1983).
53. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (1996). The statute became effective in 1987 and specified exceptions
where joint and several liability continued to apply. See id. The exceptions are: (1) to any person or persons who

acted with the intention of inflicting injury or damage; (2) to any persons whose relationship to each other would
make one person vicariously liable for the acts of the other, but only to that portion of the total liability attributed
to those persons; (3) to any persons strictly liable for the manufacture and sale of a defective product, but only to
that portion of the total liability attributed to those persons; or (4) to situations not covered by any of the foregoing
and having a sound basis in public policy. See id.
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the doctrine is related to contributory negligence. Indeed, the Scott v. Rizzo court
anticipated that adaptations of various existing rules would have to be made on a
case-by-case basis' and left most of the adaptations to the courts, stating that it had
"great faith in the ability of our state's trial judges to sort out any problems that may
arise."55

Thus, in the wake of adopting pure comparative negligence and several liability,
New Mexico courts addressed a number of doctrines, both substantive and
procedural. The Scott court addressed two of them-last clear chance and the
distinction between ordinary and gross negligence in the contributory negligence
context.56 As a result, key doctrines have been abolished, including the two
abolished in Scott, and some have been modified or retained.
C. Abolished Doctrines

1. Last clear chance
The last clear chance doctrine allows a negligent plaintiff to recover if the
defendant knew or should have known of the plaintiff's peril and had a clear
chance, by the exercise of ordinary care, to avoid the injury. 7 The doctrine was
developed as a means of neutralizing the harsh consequences resulting from a
contributory negligence defense. 8 In order to apply the doctrine, the defendant
needs to have time for appreciation, thought, and time to act effectively to avoid the
accident causing injury to the plaintiff.5 9 When it abolished contributory negligence
in New Mexico, the supreme court explicitly abolished the last clear chance
doctrine because such "rules designed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory
negligence [were] no longer needed."
2. Gross negligence as a bar to the defense of contributory negligence
A defendant's gross negligence6 ' historically barred the defense of contributory
negligence in New Mexico.62 In Gray v. Esslinger,63 the court explained that the use
54. See, e.g., Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M. 689,691,712 P.2d 1351, 1353 (1985).
55. Scott, 96 N.M. at 688, 634 P.2d at 1240.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
See Handley v. Halladay, 92 N.M. 76,77, 582 P.2d 1289, 1290 (1978).
See id.
See Catalano v. Lewis, 90 N.M. 215, 217, 561 P.2d 488,490 (Ct. App. 1977).
Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
Most courts have determined that gross negligence falls short of a reckless disregard of the

AL,
consequences, and differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind. See W. PAGE KEETON LEr
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON ET ALI.
62. See Gray v. Esslinger, 46 N.M. 421, 429-30, 130 P.2d 24, 29 (1942). New Mexico has historically
recognized the right to recover punitive damages in cases of tort where the plaintiff can show gross negligence,
malice, or circumstances of aggravation. See id at 428, 130 P.2d at 28 (citations omitted). Later, the New Mexico
Supreme Court rejected gross negligence as a basis for punitive damages in a contract action. See Paiz v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 118 N.M. 203, 211,880 P.2d 300, 308 (1994). However, in Clay v. Ferreilgas, Inc., 118
N.M. 266, 269, 881 P.2d 11,14 (1994), anegligence action, the court stated that to be liable for punitive damages,
the wrongdoer must "have some culpable mental state" and his conduct must "rise to awillful, wanton, malicious,
reckless, oppressive, or fraudulent level..." Id Noteably, Clay did not specify whether gross negligence was
sufficient, but New Mexico's jury instructions retained grossly negligent conduct as abasis for punitive damages
until July 1, 1998. See Torres v. El Paso Electric Co., 127 N.M. 729,740,987 P.2d 386, 397 (1999). The Torres
court declined to reach the question for Tones' claim, which was filed while the jury instruction included gross
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of the doctrine did not impose comparative negligence, but was "merely a
circumstance to be considered along with all other evidence in determining whether
the act complained of is of such character as to... the denial of the defense of
contributory negligence." Upon adoption of comparative negligence, however, the
New Mexico Supreme Court abolished the use of gross negligence to bar the
defense of contributory negligence because, like the doctrine of last clear chance,
it was no longer needed.65
3. Open and obvious danger
The doctrine of open and obvious danger imposes a duty on a property
owner/occupant to use ordinary care to protect a business visitor from known or
obvious dangers only if: (1) the owner/occupant knows or has reason to know of a
dangerous condition on his premises involving unreasonable risk to a visitor and (2)
the owner/occupant should reasonably anticipate that the visitor will not discover
or realize the danger or that harm will result even though the visitor knows or has
reason to know of the danger.' Under the rule, there is no duty of care if the
condition is open and obvious and there is no reason to believe it constitutes a
danger because it is reasonable to believe the visitor will discover the danger and
thus it is not an unreasonable risk.67 Thus, the doctrine essentially eliminates a
defendant's duty of care when a plaintiff's injury was caused by the plaintiff's
negligent failure to observe an obvious danger.
The doctrine of open and obvious danger was abolished in Klopp v. Wackenhut
Corporation, which held that in a place of public accommodation, an occupier of
the premises owes a duty to safeguard each business visitor whom the occupier
reasonably may foresee could be injured by a danger avoidable through reasonable
precautions available to the occupier of the premises.69 In discussing the holding,
the court stated that "[i]f we were to accept that no duty is owed to invitees
foreseeably injured ...through contributory negligence, we would vitiate the
ameliorating effect of comparative fault."7 ° The court elaborated, stating "some
degree of negligence on the part of all persons is foreseeable, just like the
inquisitive propensities of children, and thus, should be taken into account by the
occupant in the exercise of ordinary care."7 1

negligence, because the concept of recklessness resolved the issue. See id
63. 46N.M. 421, 130 P.2d 24 (1942).
64. I at 430, 130 P.2d at 29.
65. See Scott v.Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 687, 634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1981).
66. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 155-56, 824 P.2d 293, 295-96 (1992).
67. See id. at 155, 824 P.2d at 295.
68. 113 N.M. 153, 824 P.2d 293 (1992).
69. See id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297. Klopp also abrogated the reasonably-careful-invitee test of Davis v.
Gabriel. See id. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297; Stetz v. Skaggs Drug Cirs., Inc., 114 N.M. 465,467, 840 P.2d 612,614
(Ct. App. 1992); Davis v. Gabriel, I II N.M. 289, 291, 804 P.2d 1108, 1110 (Ct. App. 1990). The Klopp court
commented that simply making a danger open and obvious to those exercising ordinary care does not make the risk
reasonable or relieve the owner/occupier of liability and overruled cases that appeared to have held the duty to avoid
unreasonable risk of injury to others is satisfied by an adequate warning. See Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d
at 297.
70. Klopp, 113 N.M. at 157, 824 P.2d at 297.
71. Id.
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4. Sudden emergency
The sudden emergency doctrine provides a defense for a person who, confronted
with a sudden or unexpected event calling for immediate action, does not have the
opportunity to weigh the safety of alternate courses of action. 2 In such a situation,
the person "cannot be expected to act with the same accuracy of judgment as [a
person] who has had time to reflect on the situation."" The sudden emergency
doctrine was devised to ameliorate the sometimes harsh results of contributory
negligence that would affect the plaintiff, but over the years it has become available
to a defendant also." In Dunleavy v. Miller 5 New Mexico eliminated the doctrine
because use of the doctrine was "merely an application of the standard of ordinary
care.",76 The Dunleavy court stated that the sudden emergency instruction "merely
directs the jury's attention to one of the circumstances ... to be considered in
evaluating the reasonableness of the actor's behavior."' Furthermore, the court
stated that the instruction on sudden emergency "unduly emphasize[d] the 'under
the circumstances' portion of the standard [of care], thereby potentially confusing
"978
the jury ....
Because a bar to recovery for negligence is incompatible with apportionment of
fault and because the sudden emergency doctrine evolved to apply to defendants'
negligence as well as plaintiffs' contributory negligence, the sudden emergency
doctrine is not necessarily incompatible with comparative negligence.79 In this
respect, it is more like the unavoidable accident rule,' which offered the defense
that an accident was unavoidable to a defendant before New Mexico abolished the
defense prior to adopting comparative negligence. In abolishing the doctrine, the
New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned that the ordinary instructions on negligence
and proximate cause were sufficient to describe the plaintiff's burden of proof and
an additional instruction "is not only unnecessary but is confusing... [and] may
mislead the jury ....
5. Complicity
The doctrine of complicity bars recovery under a dramshop act to anyone who
"actively contributes to, procures, participates in, or encourages the intoxication of
the inebriated driver." 82 This applies to a plaintiff's voluntary intoxication if the
plaintiff is a passenger in the car driven by the inebriated driver involved in an

72.

See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353,356,862 P.2d 1212, 1215 (1993) (citing KEETON ETAL, supra

note 61, § 33, at 196).
73. Id.
74. See id.
75. 116 N.M. 353, 862 P.2d 1212 (1993).
76.
77.

Id. at 357, 862 P.2d at 1216.
Id.

78. Id. at 357, 359, 862 P.2d at 1216, 1218.
79. See id.at 358-59, 862 P.2d at 1217-18.

80. See id.
81. Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 719, 507 P.2d 778, 780 (1973) (abolishing the defense of

unavoidable accident prior to the adoption of comparative negligence).
82. Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M. 48, 50, 752 P.2d 240, 242 (1988).
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accident that injures or kills the plaintiff.8 3 Implicit in the doctrine is that a
tavemkeeper is liable for injuries arising from actions of the inebriated driver.
Historically, though, the common law did not make a tavernkeeper liable for
injuries resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquor to an inebriated customer." In
New Mexico, the duty of a tavernkeeper to a third party for injuries that might result
from the customer's conduct was established in Lopez v. Maez.8 5 In Lopez, the court
held that
a person may be subject to liability if he or she breaches his or her duty by
violating a statute or regulation that prohibits the selling or serving of alcoholic
liquor to an intoxicated person; the breach of which is found to be the proximate
cause of injuries to a third party. 6
At the time of Lopez, there was a New Mexico law that forbade serving alcoholic
beverages to any person who was obviously intoxicated, 7 but complicity could be
used as a defense. However, in Baxter v. Noce,88 New Mexico did away with the
defense of complicity, applying comparative negligence instead. 9 In disposing of
complicity, the Baxter court stated that "[clomplicity, while superficially dissimilar,
is only a hybrid form of contributory negligence and is identical to it in
application. '
6. Sole proximate cause
Under the sole proximate cause doctrine, a plaintiff in a comparative negligence
action is barred from recovery for loss or injury caused by the negligence of another
only if the plaintiff's negligence and/or that of someone other than the defendant is
the sole legal cause of the damage. 9 Alleging that the plaintiff's negligence is the
sole proximate cause of the occurrence causing damages is a widely used defense
in the pure comparative negligence jurisdictions.9 2 In Armstrong v. Industrial
Electric and Equipment Service,93 however, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
found that the defense of sole proximate cause was not necessary under comparative
negligence when it determined that there was no error in omitting from the

83. See id.
84. See Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M. 625,629,651 P.2d 1269, 1273 (1982).
85. 98 N.M. 625,651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
86. Id. at 632, 651 P.2d at 1276. The Lopez court discussed whether the actions of the inebriated customer
were intervening causes sufficient to release the provider of the alcohol from liability and determined that the
consequences of serving liquor to an intoxicated person whom the server knows or could have known is driving

a car is reasonably foreseeable. See id.
87. See id.The legislature subsequentlynarrowed the liability of tavernkeepers, exempted social hosts from
liability, and set out the elements that would constitute a breach of the duty established in Lopez. See Baxter v.
Noce, 107 N.M. 48, 50,752 P.2d 240, 242 (1988) (citing Trujillo v. Trujillo, 104 N.M. 379,383,721 P.2d 1310,
1313-14 (Ct. App. 1986) and Walker v. Key, 101 N.M. 631, 636, 686 P.2d 973, 978 (Ct. App. 1984)).
88. 107 N.M. 48, 752 P.2d 240(1988).
89. See id.
at 51,752 P.2d at 243.
90. Id.
91. See Armstrong v. Indus. Elec. and Equip. Serv., 97 N.M. 272, 276,639 P.2d 81, 85 (Ct. App. 1981)
(citing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431,438 (Fla. 1973) and Pittman v. Volusia County, 380 So. 2d 1192,1195
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980)).
92. See id at 276, 639 P.2d at 85.
93. 97 N.M. 272, 639 P.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1981).
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proximate cause instruction the language that a cause need not be the only cause."
The defense is not necessary because under the doctrine of comparative negligence,
even with the omission, the fact finder can still find either the negligence of the
plaintiff or the defendant as a sole proximate cause of a plaintiff's injuries."
D. Retained or Modified Doctrines
1. Strict liability

In the products liability context, an injured user or consumer may recover against

a supplier or manufacturer without having to prove negligence. 96 The doctrine
evolved as a matter of public policy, placing liability on the party primarily
responsible for the condition giving rise to the injury, that is, the manufacturer.97
New Mexico recognized that the policy concern was on the nature of the defect, not
how a consumer obtained the product, and adopted strict liability for both sellers
and lessors of a defective product in 1972.98
Conventional contributory negligence was inapplicable as a defense in strict
liability cases, 99 but a plaintiff's assumption of risk was a defense.'0° After adopting
comparative negligence, New Mexico recognized conventional negligence as a
partial defense in strict liability actions." ° New Mexico has also retained
assumption of risk, but as a partial defense to strict liability."°2 In addition, New
Mexico has retained joint and several liability for persons strictly liable for the
manufacture and sale of a defective product, but their liability is only for that
portion of the total liability attributed to them. °3 It follows, then, that comparative

94. See id.
at 277, 639 P.2d at 86.
95. See id.
96. See Trujillo v. Berry, 106 N.M. 86, 87, 738 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Ct. App. 1987).
97. See Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83 N.M. 730, 734, 497 P.2d 732, 736 (1972).
98. See id. at 734-35, 497 P.2d at 736-37.
99. See Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation, Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 577,592 P.2d 175, 177 (1979); Jasper v. Skyhook
Corp., 89 N.M. 98, 101,547 P.2d 1140,1143 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d
934 (1977), overruled on other grounds by Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297
(1992); Bendorf v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeselischaft, 88 N.M. 355, 357,540 P.24 835, 837 (Ct. App. 1975).
Bendorfdiscusses three possible defenses in a products liability case: (I) plaintiff's negligent failure to discover
the defective condition, (2) plaintiff discovers the defect and is aware of the danger but nevertheless makes use of
it, and (3) plaintiff misuses the product. See id. at 358-59, 540 P.2d at 838-39. Bendorf was not inclined to
recognize the first, did recognize the second, and did not "enter the quagmire" by making a ruling on the third. See
id. The second defense is now called contributory negligence in the form of assumption of risk and is not
considered conventional contributory negligence, as is the first defense. See Jasper,89 N.M. at 101,547 P.2d at
1143.
100. See Bendorf, 88 N.M. at 357, 540 P.2d at 838-39.
101. See Marchese v. WarnerCommunications, Inc., 105 N.M. 313,317,670 P.2d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 1983).
102. See Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 590, 915 P.2d 341, 346 (Ct. App. 1996). For a more detailed
discussion of assumption of the risk, see infra text accompanying notes 105-112.
103. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-1 (1996). Parties found jointly and severally liable may obtain
contribution through the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. See id,§§ 41-3-1 to -8; supra text
accompanying note 52. Proportional indemnification is also available for limited circumstances. See In re Consol.
Vista Hills Retaining Wall Litig., 119 N.M. 542, 552, 893 P.2d 438, 448 (1995) (adopting the doctrine of
proportional indemnification under which "a defendant who is otherwise denied apportionment of fault may seek
partial recovery from another at fault"). The court noted that "proportional indemnification need not apply when
a factfinder makes a determination that a concurrent tortfeasor is proportionally liable to an injured party, [nor
when the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act] provides for proration of damages among joint
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4
negligence could be applicable to determine their portion of the total liability.10
Thus, under its comparative negligence regime, New Mexico has adopted defenses
to strict liability that are modified from those applicable under contributory
negligence and it has modified its joint and several liability for strict liability cases.

2. Assumption of risk
Assumption of risk by a plaintiff may be express or implied. Express assumption
of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has expressly consented to relieve the
defendant of a legal duty that he owes to the plaintiff.'015 Unless a court holds that
the agreement is invalid for policy reasons or finds that the risk is disproportionate
to the plaintiff's reason for assuming the risk, assumption of the risk will prevent
a cause of action.'06
Assumption of risk may also be implied from the plaintiff's conduct under the
circumstances."m7 In its "primary" sense, implied assumption of risk corresponds to
a defendant's lack of duty or absence of breach of duty, i.e., nonnegligence of a
defendant." In its "secondary" sense, it is an affumative defense to an established
breach of duty."°9 After New Mexico adopted comparative negligence, the court of
appeals addressed and retained the primary sense of assumption of risk in Yount v.
Johnson."' The court stated that "primary assumption of risk remains with our
jurisprudence as a shorthand for a judicial declaration of no duty of ordinary care,
or breach of that duty, depending on the circumstances of a particular relationship
between the parties.""' The court noted that secondary assumption of risk had
earlier been merged with contributory negligence and now was addressed through
comparative negligence." 2 Thus, although assumption of risk as a total defense to
liability is not retained, assumption of risk as a form of negligence is retained in
New Mexico for establishing duty.

tortfeasors." Id. The court also declined to replace completely traditional indemnification with proportional
indemnification, stating that "[w]e are filling a void in the overall picture that contemplates proration of liability
among all those at fault. That void occurs in this case because the [plaintiffs] chose to sue only [one defendant]
under [a contract] cause of action." Id. at 553, 893 P.2d at 449.
104. Comparative negligence has also been applied to cases involving negligence per se. See Lamkin v.
Garcia, 106 N.M. 60,63,738 P.2d 932, 936 (1987) (allowing instruction on excuse andjustification in conjunction

with the comparative negligence instruction).
105. See KzroNETAL, supra note 61, § 68, at 480-81.
106. See Kirtan K. Khalsa, Note, Tort Law-A Cause ofAction for Negligent Horseplay: Yount v. Johnson,
27 N.M. L REV. 661,664 (1997).
107. See KEENETAL, supra note 61, § 68, at 484.
108. See Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336, 340,491 P.2d 1147, 1150 (1971).
109. See id.
110. 121 N.M. 585,915 P.2d 341 (Ct. App. 1996).
111. Id. at 590,915 P.2d at 346. See, e.g., Kabella v. Bouschelle, 100 N.M. 461,465,672 P.2d 290,294 (Ct.
App. 1983) (holding that in pick-up football, like organized sports, the standard of recklessness or intentional and
wilful misconduct applies); Yount, 121 N.M. at 591, 915 P.2d at 347 (holding that for horseplay, the traditional

standard of reasonable care and comparative negligence applies). However, voluntary exposure to a known danger
has been treated variously. See Yardman v. San Juan Downs, Inc., 120 N.M. 751,756,906 P.2d 742, 747 (Ct. App.
1995) (holding there was sufficient evidence to require an instruction regarding plaintiff's awareness of danger);

Thompson v. Ruidoso-Sunland, Inc., 105 N.M. 487, 492, 734 P.2d 267, 272 (Ct. App. 1987) (finding that
voluntary exposure to a known danger is secondary assumption of risk, which was abolished in Williamson).
112. See Yount, 121 N.M. at 590,915 P.2d at 346.
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3. Third party intentional torts

Third party intentional torts describe a situation where a party was negligent but
another tortfeasor's conduct was intentional. While the liability of the intentional
tortfeasor is governed by the New Mexico statute imposing joint and several

liability, the liability of the concurrent negligent tortfeasor is not.' 13 The New
Mexico Court of Appeals declined to apply comparative negligence to a concurrent

tortfeasor in Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc.," 4 where a bar owner hired a
doorman with a propensity to engage in fights, and the doorman subsequently
assaulted a patron." 5 Despite the notions of fairness relied on in Scott and Bartlett

suggesting that comparative fault should apply, the court reasoned that because the
tort was a reasonably foreseeable result of the negligent hiring, the owner was

vicariously liable for the total injury and comparative fault did not apply." 6
In contrast to Medina, the New Mexico Supreme Court did apply comparative
negligence in a similar situation in Reichert v. Atler,"' where a bar patron was
injured when another patron assaulted him. " The court found that the bar owner's

negligent failure to protect patrons from foreseeable harm may be compared to the
conduct of the third party in determining liability." 9 However, the Reichert court
emphasized that the holding did not hinge on the third party conduct being
intentional; the court was simply applying the reasoning in Bartlett that each
individual tortfeasor should be held responsible only for his percentage of the
harm."no The reasoning in the two cases suggests that the principles of comparative

fault should apply to a concurrent tortfeasor unless the tortfeasor's conduct is
covered by one of New Mexico's exceptions to several liability.''
4. Mitigation of damages, avoidable consequences
Under the doctrine of avoidable consequences, a party is not entitled to damages
for harm that he could have avoided by the use of reasonable effort after the
negligent action of the tortfeasor.' 2 Avoidable consequences, also known as
1
mitigation of damages, is applicable to both negligence and to intentional torts.'

113. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-3A-i(CX) (1996); Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 623,626,875 P.2d 379,382
(1994); Medina v. Graham's Cowboys, Inc., 113 N.M. 471.475,827 P.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 1992).
114. 113 N.M. 471,827 P.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1992).
115. See id. at 473, 827 P.2d at 861. The court found that even though the doorman was not acting within
his scope of employment, the owner was liable under the theory of negligent hiring. See id at 475, 827 P.2d at 863.
116. See id. at 474-76, 827 P.2d at 862-64. The court justified the vicarious liability on duty and causal
connection, that is, the finding of the district court that Cowboys had a duty not to endanger patrons by negligently
hiring violent persons who are on call on the premises at Cowboys' request See id at 473, 476, 827 P.2d at 860,
863. The court did note that comparative negligence may still apply to negligent hiring to reduce the owner's (but
not the intentional tortfeasor's) liability if, for instance, the victim had also been negligent. See id at 476, 827 P.2d
at 864.
117. 117 N.M. 623, 875 P.2d 379 (1994).
118. See id. at 626, 875 P.2d at 382.
119. See id.; see also Barth v. Coleman, 118 N.M. 1,4,878 P.2d 319, 322 (1994) (affirming the holding in
Reichert).
120. See Reichert, 117 N.M. at 625, 875 P.2d at 381.
121. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
122. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977).
123. See Ledbetter v. Webb, 103 N.M. 597.605,711 P.2d 874,882 (1985) (Stowers, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); RESTATEMENT, supranote 122 (stating that one is not prevented from recovering damages if
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In Ledbetter v. Webb," 4 the plaintiff misrepresented the condition of a machine, but
the defendants failed to heed warning signs that showed that the machine was
malfunctioning and in need of repairs." The New Mexico Supreme Court
concluded the trial court erred when it determined that damages assessed against the
defendants" were for comparative negligence rather than for failure to mitigate
damages.127 Justice Stowers, in an opinion concurring on the issue, pointed out that
because the injured party cannot recover damages caused by that party's negligence,
the conclusion was proper and stated that "[m]itigation of damages raises questions
of causation, not of comparative fault."' a Thus, it would appear that'New Mexico
views the doctrines of mitigation of damages and comparative negligence as
compatible because their roles do not overlap.
5. Minor plaintiff
New Mexico courts usually determine a minor's negligence based on a "child's
standard of care," which asks whether the child "exercised that degree of care
ordinarily exercised by children of like age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience under the same or similar circumstances."'2 9 A minor's breach of duty
of care could be asserted by a plaintiff as negligence or used by a defendant as a
defense."3 According to Scott, questions concerning the minor plaintiff should not
be affected by the comparative negligence doctrine.' Indeed, comparative
negligence merely eliminates the negligence of a child as a complete bar or defense
to the child's action for personal injuries, just as it does for the negligence of an
adult.' Thus, whether or not a child can be guilty of negligence addresses a kind
of "competence," is not related to the policies underlying the comparative principles
of Scott, and has not changed with the adoption of comparative negligence.'

the tortfeasor intended the harm or was in reckless disregard of it, unless the injured person intentionally or
heedlessly failed to protect his own interests).
124. 103 N.M. 597,711 P.2d 874 (1985).
125. See id at 603, 711 P.2dat 880.
126. The New Mexico Supreme Court did not disturb the trial court's finding that the defendants suffered
consequential damages as a result of the plaintiffs' misrepresentations. See id. The trial court did, however, find
that some of the business losses were caused by the defendants' failure to exercise due care subsequent to the
plaintiffs' tortious acts of misrepresentation. See id at 605, 711 P.2d at 882 (Stowers, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
127. See id. at 603, 711 P.2d at 880. The court did not reach the question of whether New Mexico's
comparative negligence system governs the assessment of damages in actions for fraudulent misrepresentation or
other intentional torts. See id. at 605, 711 P.2d at 882 (Stowers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
128. Id. (Stowers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
129. Lerma v. State Highway Dep'tof New Mexico, 117 N.M. 782,785,877 P.2d 1085,1088 (1994) (citing
Saul v. Roman Catholic Church, 75 N.M. 160, 164,402 P.2d 48,51 (1965)); N.M. UJ.I. CIv. 13-1605; see also
Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585, 591,915 P.2d 341.347 (Ct. App. 1996). New Mexico does not apply a child's
standard of care where the child is engaging in adult and potentially dangerous activities. See Adams v. Lopez, 75
N.M. 503,507, 407 P.2d 50, 52 (1965).
130. See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 784-85, 877 P.2d at 1087-88.
131. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682,687-88,634 P.2d 1234, 1239-40 (1981). Note that some jurisdictions
hold that a child under seven is not capable of negligence as a matter of law. See N.M. U.J.1. Crv. 13-1606;
Honeycutt v. City of Wichita, 796 P.2d 549, 551-52 (Kan. 1990).

132. See Honeycutt, 796 P.2d at 554.
133. See, e.g., Lerma, 117 N.M. at 785,877 P.2d at 1088.
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6. Rescue
Under the rescue doctrine, courts have held that efforts to protect the personal
safety of another do not supersede the liability for the original negligence that
endangered it.'34 Traditionally, the rescue doctrine provided a defense to a
contributorily negligent rescuer/plaintiff35 and that a negligent defendant "may not
have foreseen the coming of a deliverer .... [but] is accountable as if he had" for
a plaintiff's injury in an emergency. 136 Under comparative negligence, the New
Mexico Supreme Court has concluded that the rescue doctrine is only needed to
establish and identify the duty owed the rescuer, and as such "remains vital under
New Mexico's comparative negligence regime.' 1 37 Thus, in New Mexico, the
doctrine is used to establish duty, and it 3is
8 not needed to insulate the
plaintiff/rescuer under comparative negligence.
7. Independent intervening cause
Prior to Torres, the New Mexico Supreme Court looked at the issue of
independent intervening cause in the context of comparative negligence in
Richardson v. Carnegie. 39 The court only mentioned comparative negligence in a
discussion of whether an independent intervening cause existed, however." ° The
court did not determine whether the independent intervening cause doctrine is
consistent with New Mexico's system of pure comparative fault until Torres."
E. Summary
Over the years since it eliminated contributory negligence and joint and several
liability for concurrent tortfeasors, New Mexico has eliminated, modified, or
retained various tort doctrines using several criteria. The key criteria the court has
used are whether (1) the doctrine served to avoid the harshness of contributory
negligence and thus is no longer necessary; (2) abolition will assure fairness to
defendants; and (3) abolition will avoid overemphasis to or confusion of the jury.
Because their role in ameliorating the harshness of contributory negligence is no
longer needed under a comparative negligence regime, the last clear chance
doctrine, the distinction between ordinary and gross negligence in the contributory
negligence context, open and obvious danger, and complicity have been
abolished. 42 For the same reason, New Mexico does not require a separate
instruction for sole proximate cause.' 4 3 Joint and several liability generally has been
abolished where abolition assures fairness to defendants and does not conflict with

134.
135.
N.M. 137,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
N.M. 153,
143.

See KEETON ET AL, supra note 61, § 44, at 307.
See Govich v. N. Am Sys., Inc., 112 N.M. 226,231,814 P.2d 94,99 (1991); Mitchefl v. Pettigrew, 65
141, 333 P.2d 879, 882 (1958).
See Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 438 (N.Y. 1921).
Govich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
See id.
107 N.M. 688, 763 P.2d 1153 (1988).
See id. at 701,763 P.2d at 1166.
See Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 127 N.M. 729, 735, 987 P.2d 386, 392 (1999).
See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 687,634 P.2d 1234, 1239 (1981); Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113
157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992); Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M. 48, 51,752 P.2d 240, 243 (1988).
See Armstrong v. Indus. Elec. and Equip. Serv., 97 N.M. 272, 277,639 P.2d 81, 86 (Ct. App. 1981).
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duty and causation (as it did in Medina).' The sudden emergency and unavoidable
accident doctrines historically related to more than one aspect of negligence or
liability, with the result that they tended to overemphasize the circumstances and
had the potential for confusing the jury." 5 Because of the risk of confusion, the New
Mexico Supreme Court abolished them."
Where a doctrine is important in determining duty or breach of duty, it has been
retained. New Mexico has retained primary assumption of risk and the rescue
doctrine because they remain important in determining duty." 7 It has retained a
standard of care for a minor plaintiff that is different from an adult's for the purpose
of determining a minor's breach of duty.'" Because the interests behind the doctrine
are addressed by comparative negligence, assumption of risk is no longer used for
contributory negligence in New Mexico." 9 Similarly, the rescue doctrine is no
longer used as a defense to a plaintiff's contributory negligence? 5°
IV. RATIONALE
The Torres court concluded that the use of Uniform Jury Instruction 13-306' '
for independent intervening cause in addition to Uniform Jury Instruction 13-305 "2
for proximate cause unduly emphasized a defendant's attempt to escape liability by
asserting an absence of proximate cause. 53 The court also determined that the use
of both instructions was repetitive and likely to lead to jury confusion and
misdirection.}' Uniform Jury Instruction 13-305 includes the statement that "[a]
proximate cause of an injury is that which in a natural and continuous sequence
[unbroken by an independent intervening cause] produces the injury, and without
which the injury would not have occurred.' 55 Uniform Jury Instruction 13-306
defines a portion of Uniform Jury Instruction 13-305: "An independent intervening
cause interrupts and turns aside a course of events and produces that which was not
foreseeable as a result of an earlier act or omission."' 5'

144. See Reichert v. Atler, 117 N.M. 623,625, 875 P.2d 379, 381 (1994); Medina v. Graham's Cowboys,
Inc., 113 N.M. 471,474-76, 827 P.2d 859, 862-64 (Ct. App. 1992).
145. See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 357, 359, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216, 1218 (1993); Alexander v.
Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 719,507 P.2d 778,780 (1973).
146. See Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 357, 862 P.2d at 1218; Alexander, 84 N.M. at 719, 507 P.2d at 780.
147. See Yount v. Johnson, 121 N.M. 585,590,915 P.2d 341,346 (Ct.App. 1996); Govich v. N. Am. Sys.
Inc., 112 N.M. 226,232, 814 P.2d 94, 100(1991).
148. See Ierma v. State Highway Dep't of New Mexico, 117 N.M. 782, 785,877 P.2d 1085, 1088 (1994).
149. See Williamson v. Smith, 83 N.M. 336,340-41,491 P.2d 1147,1151-2 (1971); Yount, 121 N.M. at590,

915 P.2d at 346.
150. See Govich, 112 N.M. at 232, 814 P.2d at 100.
151. N.M. U.J.1. Civ. 13-306.
152. N.M. U.J.I. CIV. 13-305.
153. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736-37, 987 P.2d at 393-94 (citing State ex rel. State Highway Comm'n v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 76 N.M. 587,590,417 P.2d 68,70 (1966) ("Instructions that are repetitious or
unduly emphasis should not be given.")).
154. See id. at 737,987 P.2d at 394 (citing Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 359, 862 P.2d 1212, 1218
(1993) ("It is not necessary for the judge to charge the jury a second time that the law requires it to consider the
circumstances...."); Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717,719,507 P.2d 778,780 (1973) ("The defendant is not

entitled to have (the] defense [of not proximately causing the injury] overemphasized.").
155. N.M. U.J.L CIv. 13-305 (brackets in original).
156. N.M. UJ.I. Cirv. 13-306.
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In determining the usefulness of the independent intervening cause doctrine
under New Mexico's comparative negligence scheme, the Torres court expressly
limited its analysis to negligent acts or omissions by a third party or the plaintiff
that are causes in fact of the plaintiff s injury.' In its analysis, the court noted that
although the doctrine of independent intervening cause did not originate in response
to the harshness of contributory negligence and potential unfairness of joint and
several liability, it has served to relieve both plaintiffs and defendants of
responsibility.'" The court pointed out that the doctrine has been used to relieve a
defendant of complete liability underjoint and several liability when a third party's
negligence is grossly disproportionate to that of the defendant 5 9 and to immunize
a negligent plaintiff from being barred from recovery. 160The court viewed such an
"expansive application of the doctrine" as inconsistent with New Mexico's system
of pure comparative fault. 6
The court was concerned that when the defendant attempts to shift fault to a
plaintiff, the overlap in the proximate cause and independent intervening cause
instructions "creates an unacceptable risk that the jury will inadvertently apply the
common law rule of contributory negligence .... ."" Because of the risk of
prejudice that would result from the inadvertent application of contributory
negligence, the court directed that the jury not be instructed on independent
intervening cause for a plaintiff s alleged comparative negligence and held that the
doctrine does not apply to a plaintiff s negligence.'63
In the case of a defendant attempting to shift fault to a tortfeasor other than the
plaintiff, the Torres court thought that the extra jury instruction on independent
intervening cause "would unduly emphasize the conduct of one tortfeasor over
another and would potentially conflict with the jury's duty to apportion fault."'" On
that basis, the court stated that the doctrine of independent intervening cause should
be carefully applied so as not to conflict with New Mexico's use of several
liability, 65 but went on to state that application of the doctrine to the intervening
negligence of third parties does not necessarily conflict with several liability.'" The
court recognized that "[t]here are many cases in which the unforeseeable negligence

157. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736,987 P.2d at 393 n.2. The court further stated that their analysis did not
extend to intentional torts or criminal acts or forces of nature. See id
158. Seeid. at735,987 P.2dat392.
159. See id at 736,987 P.2d at 393 (citing Holden v. Balko, 949 F.Supp. 704,708-09 (S.D. Ind. 1996)).

160. See id. at 735,987 P.2d at 392 (citing Terry Christlieb, Note, Why Superseding Cause Analysis Should
be Abandoned, 72 TEx. L REv. 161, 165-66 (1993)).
161. See id. at 736,987 P.2d at 393.

162. Id.
163.

See id. at 737, 987 P.2d at 394. For support, the court cited Brooks v. Logan, 903 P.2d 73, 80-81 (Idaho

1995), which stated that for plainiffs acts, comparative negligence was a more appropriate question than
intervening, superceding cause, and Von Der Heide v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 718 A.2d

286, 289 (Pa. 1998), which stated that an instruction on superceding cause based on a plaintiff's negligence was
more properly considered under comparative negligence principles. See id
164.

I at 737, 987 P.2d at 394.

165. See id (citing LK.1. Holdings, Inc. v.Tyner, 658 N.E.2d 111,119 (hid. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that
comparative negligence renders protection of a remote actor through intervening cause unnecessary).
166. See id.
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"9167
of a third party can reasonably be said to break the chain of causation ....
Recognizing that the doctrine of independent intervening cause could be appropriate
in circumstances where one actor is too far removed for society to hold him
responsible, the court concluded that "some of the principles underlying the
doctrine.., remain important in our current tort system.""'6
Despite the importance of some of the principles underlying independent
intervening cause,"6 9 the court eliminated the' i7separate instruction on the doctrine to

"simplify[] the complex task of the jury[,]'

°

believing that the proximate cause

be adequate.' 7'

The court explained that New Mexico cases show
instruction would
a trend toward simplifying causation issues to the jury172 and that "independent
intervening cause adds a complex layer of analysis to the jury's determination of
proximate cause.' 7' The court concluded that the independent intervening cause
instruction was "sufficiently repetitive of the instruction on proximate cause and the
task of apportioning fault that any potential for jury confusion and misdirection
outweighs its usefulness.'

4

The court then instructed trial courts not to give

Uniform Jury Instruction 13-306 and not to include a reference to independent
intervening cause in Uniform Jury Instruction 13-305, stating "the instruction on
proximate cause will adequately ensure a proper verdict.'1 ' Thus, the Torres court
cause as a concept separate from
eliminated the doctrine of independent intervening
76
that of proximate cause in negligence contexts.1
V. ANALYSIS
The Torres decision was a logical progression in New Mexico's comparative
negligence jurisprudence. In its analysis, the court used the criteria that New
Mexico courts have applied to test the validity of tort doctrines in the wake of the
adoption of comparative negligence and several liability: the importance of avoiding
any application of contributory negligence, unfairness to either plaintiff or
defendant, and jury confusion.'" The court's analysis was true to the thrust of
167. Id. The court cited Straley v. Kimberly, 687 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997), as an example. In
Straley, the court concluded that where a gas explosion occurred more than one hour after the defendants had called
the gas company and the gas company had assumed control of the site, the defendants were not the proximate cause
of the plaintiff's injuries as a matter of law. The Straley court noted that where the negligent actor was so removed
from the resulting injury that society cannot hold him responsible, precedent applying comparative fault was not
applicable. See Straley, 687 N.E.2d at 366 n.4.
168. Torres, 127 N.M. at 737, 987 P.2d at 394. Arguably, under comparative negligence, there is no

justification for the doctrine. See Hercules, Inc. v. Stevens Shipping Co., 765 F.2d 1069, 1075 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(determining that under the proportional fault system, nojustification exists for applying the doctrine of intervening

negligence unless it can be said that one party's negligence did not in any way contribute to the loss).
169. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 737, 987 P.2d at 394.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 738, 987 P.2d at 395.
172. See id. at 737,987 P.2d at 394; see also Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 359,862 P.2d 1212, 1218
(1993); Alexander v. Delgado, 84 N.M. 717, 719-20, 507 P.2d 778, 780-81 (1973).

173. Torres, 127 N.M. at 738, 987 P.2d at 395.
174.

Id.

175. id.
176. See id.
177. Because the Torres court eliminated the doctrine of independent intervening cause for multiple acts of
negligence without specifying that the acts be concurrent, the holding may potentially apply to subsequent
tortfeasor situations that involve joint and several liability of original tortfeasors. See Lujan v. Healthsouth
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comparative negligence to apportion fault between or among parties whose
negligence proximately causes loss or injury and to apportion damages in
proportion to the parties' fault." 8 In addition, the analysis followed the trend in New
Mexico to simplify the task of the jury.
The court's analysis of independent intervening cause was composed of two
primary steps. First, the court examined whether retaining the independent
intervening cause doctrine would in effect apply contributory negligence and result
in unfairness to a plaintiff.'79 Second, the court evaluated whether extra jury
instructions would overemphasize a defendant's attempts to shift fault, confusing
the jury and conflicting with its duty to apportion fault." °
Like other cases that have examined the continuing validity of pre-existing tort
doctrines under comparative negligence in New Mexico, Torres examined the
extent to which the doctrine of independent intervening cause served to ameliorate
the harshness of contributory negligence, because any doctrine that did so was no
longer necessary.' 8' The court observed that the independent intervening cause
doctrine reflects traditional notions of proximate causation and the need to limit
liability, and that it did not originate in response to contributory negligence. ' Thus,
the doctrine's relationship to comparative negligence is unlike the clear
incompatibility of comparative negligence with the now-abolished doctrines of last
clear chance and gross negligence as a bar to a contributory negligence defense,'
open and obvious danger,' and complicity,' 85 which were developed because of the
harsh effects of contributory negligence.
However, as the court pointed out, the independent intervening cause doctrine
is analogous to the abolished doctrine of sudden emergency. 6 Although sudden
emergency was designed to ameliorate the harshness of contributory negligence"8 7
and independent intervening cause was not, 88 they both evolved to be applicable
to the actions of defendants as well as plaintiffs. 8 9 In addition, each doctrine was
addressed in more than one instruction."9°
The crux of the Torres court's concern was that the independent intervening
cause concept is sufficiently addressed in the proximate cause instruction language:
A proximate cause of an injury is that which in a natural and continuous

Rehabilitation Corp., 120 N.M. 422,426-27,902 P.2d 1025, 1029-30(1995); see also N.M. STAT.ANN. § 41-3A-1
(1996). However, the role of independent intervening cause in such a situation or in otherjoint and several liability

situations that remain in New Mexico, which may involve intentional torts rather than negligence, is beyond the

scope of this note. See id. § 41-3A- 1. Indeed, the Torres court did not extend its analysis to intentional tortious or
criminal acts. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736,987 P.2d at 393 n.2.
178. See Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 688, 634 P.2d 1234, 1240 (1981).
179. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736-37, 987 P.2d at 393-94.
180. See id
181. See id at 736, 987 P.2d at 393.
182. See id at 735, 987 P.2d at 392.
183. See Scott, 96 N.M. at 687, 634 P.2d at 1239.
184. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992).
185. See Baxter v. Noce, 107 N.M. 48, 51,752 P.2d 240, 243 (1988).
186. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 735, 987 P.2d at 392.
187. See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 358, 862 P.2d 1212,1217 (1993).
188. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 735, 987 P.2d at 392.

189. See id. at 736, 987 P.2d at 393; Duleavy, 116 N.M. at 358, 862 P.2d at 1217.
190. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736, 987 P.2d at 393; Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 359, 862 P.2d at 1218.
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sequence... produces the injury.. ." and "need not be the... the last nor nearest
cause."' 91 The court believed that reiterating the concept in the separate instruction
on independent intervening cause and the independent intervening cause portion of
the proximate cause instruction would result in the jury inadvertently applying
contributory negligence.192 The court also believed that the additional
instruction
193
could affect the jury's ability to apportion fault among tortfeasors.
Similarly, the court in Dudeavy concluded that the sudden emergency instruction
duplicated another instruction and resulted in overemphasis to the jury when it
abolished the doctrine of sudden emergency.'" The concept of sudden emergency
is implicitly addressed in the standard of ordinary care stated in Uniform .Jury
Instruction 13-1603'95 with the language "the conduct in question must be
considered in the light of all the surrounding circumstances."' 96 The Dunleavy court
viewed the overemphasis that resulted from having a separate sudden emergency
instruction as having a tendency to imply a different standard for a sudden
emergency and to be potentially confusing to the jury. 91
Both courts eliminated the repetitive instructions and potential confusion when
they eliminated the doctrines.I Furthermore, because the instructions could be
tendered by either the plaintiff or defendant, any unfairness to a plaintiff or
defendant that could result was also avoided."99 However, the concern of unfairness
to either plaintiff or defendant is more characteristic of the Torres court ° than the
Dunleavy court, which focused on avoiding the implication of a different standard
of care. 2'
The Torres decision eliminated independent intervening cause for multiple acts
of negligence,' but provided very little description of acts that might be within the
holding. For instance, although the court limited the holding to negligent acts or
omissions by a third party or the plaintiff that are causes in fact of the plaintiff's

191. N.M. U.J.L. Civ. 13-305 (omitting the phrase "[unbroken by an independent intervening cause]" as the
Torres court directed).

192. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736, 987 P.2d at 393.
193. See id at 737, 987 P.2d at 394.
194. See Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 359, 862 P.2d at 1218.
195.

See id.

196. N.M. UJ.I. Civ. 13-1603.
197. See Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 359, 862 P.2d at 1218.
198.

See Torres, 127 N.M. at 738,987 P.2d at 395; Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 359,862 P.2d at 1218.

199. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736-38, 987 P.2d at 393-95; Duneavy, 116 N.M. at 358, 862 P.2d at 1217.
200. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 736-38, 987 P.2d at 393-95.
201. See Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 359, 862 P.2d at 1218.
202. See Torres, 127 N.M. at 738, 987 P.2d at 395. The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that
independent intervening cause was not applicable to either Torres' negligence or the alleged negligence of
Aldershot and its contractors. See id. at 738, 987 P.2d at 395. The doctrine did not apply to Tones because it
"uniformly does not apply to a plaintiff's negligence." Id.The doctrine did not apply to Aldershot and its
contractors because El Paso Electric Company did not introduce "evidence of any cause that prevented the natural
and probable result of its own negligence." kd The court determined that some negligence on the part of all persons
was foreseeable as part of the electric company's duty to exercise reasonable care in the installation and
maintenance of the power pole, and the negligence of Aldershot and its contractors was within the scope of the risk
created by the company. See id. at 739, 987 P.2d at 396. Because it interjected a false issue into the trial, the court
found reversible error with the giving of the independent intervening cause instruction, vacated the judgment in
favor of El Paso Electric Company on the negligence claim, and remanded the case. See id. at 732,741,987 P.2d
at 389, 398.
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injury, 3 it provided questionable dicta on its applicability to concurrent or
subsequent tortfeasors.1 Because it did not extend its analysis to intentional
tortious or criminal acts or forces of nature, the court left open the possibility for
the potential use of independent intervening cause in such situations."
VI. IMPLICATIONS
The Torres analysis presented an approach that courts may use to address the
continuing validity of other tort doctrines after the adoption of comparative
negligence and several liability. These doctrines are as follows:
A. Attractive nuisance
The attractive nuisance doctrine imposes liability, under certain conditions, on
a possessor of land having an artificial condition that causes physical harm to
trespassing children.' New Mexico has adopted the attractive nuisance doctrine,
which has evolved as an exception to the general rule that a landowner is not liable
to trespassers.2 However, when the New Mexico Supreme Court replaced the
Restatement (First) of Torts on attractive nuisance with the Restatement (Second)
°
of Torts in 1998, it did not discuss comparative negligence in its opinion."
In applying the criteria used in the Torres decision, a court would first ask
whether the doctrine at issue served to avoid the harshness of contributory
negligence. The attractive nuisance doctrine essentially allowed a child to recover
when he failed to discover or realize the risk associated with the danger, but a
2
child's contributory negligence was a separate consideration. ' Thus, under comparative negligence, a minor plaintiff's negligence would also be a separate con203. See id at 736, 987 P.2d at 393 n.2.
204. The court states that the doctrine of independent intervening cause would not apply in the Torres case
because Torres, Aldershot and its contractors, and El Paso Electric were concurrent tortfeasors. See id. at 739, 987
P.2d at 396 n.4 (citing N.M. UJ.. Civ. 13-306 comm. cmt.). The court's statement is inconsistent with New
Mexico precedent. See discussion supra part I.
205. See id. at 736, 987 P.2d at 393 n.2.
206. See RESTATEMENT, supranote 122, § 339. The conditions for liability are: (1) the possessor knows or
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, (2) the possessor knows or has reason to know and realizes
or should realize the condition involves an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to trespassing
children, (3) the children do not discover or realize the risk, (4)the utility of maintaining the condition and burden
of eliminating the danger are slight compared to the risk, and (5) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to
eliminate the danger or protect the children. See id
207. See Carmona v. Hagerman Irrigation Co., 125 N.M. 59,61-63,957 P.2d 44,46-48 (1998).
208. See id at 63,957 P.2d at 48. In an earlier case, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that a school
board had a duty of ordinary care to a nonstudent child regarding a condition on an easement on school grounds
and left the comparative negligence question to the fact finder. See Schleft v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Alamos Pub.
Sch., 109 N.M. 271,278, 784 P.2d 1014, 1021 (Ct. App. 1989). The court did not reach the question of whether
the doctrine of attractive nuisance applied because of its disposition in the case. See id at 274, 784 P.2d at 1017.
In other jurisdictions, whether attractive nuisance applies has been held to be a separate issue from a minor
plaintiff's comparative negligence. See Mathis v. Massachusetts Elec. Co., 565 N.E.2d 1180,1184 (Mass. 1991).
Recall that the Klopp court, which abolished the open and obvious danger doctrine, included the inquisitive
propensities of children when it stated that the foreseeable negligence of all persons should be taken into account
by the owner/occupant. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992). The
statement is consistent with the am-active nuisance doctrine.
209. See Saul v. Roman Catholic Church of Archdiocese of Santa Fe, 75 N.M. 160, 164, 402 P.2d 48, 51
(1965) (concluding the jury was properly instructed on the law of attractive nuisance and contributory negligence
where a ten-year-old boy trespassed and was injured); see also text accompanying note 131.
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sideration. Moreover, the attractive nuisance doctrine is universally recognized as
establishing a duty of care. 210 Because of its role in determining duty, the doctrine
is much like the rescue doctrine, which the New Mexico Supreme Court has
retained under comparative negligence.
The second question under the Torres analysis is whether extra jury instructions
associated with the doctrine would overemphasize a defendant's attempts to shift
fault, confusing the jury and conflicting with its duty to apportion fault. An
attractive nuisance instruction 2" would not be an extra instruction when submitted
in lieu of another duty instruction relating to trespass and artificial conditions on the
premises.2 1 2 The New Mexico attractive nuisance instruction instructs the jury to
consider, among other things, whether "[tihe child because of [his] [her] youth does
not discover the condition or realize the risk ... ." in determining whether the
defendant has a duty of care to the child.213 In addition to the attractive nuisance
instruction, the instruction on the standard of care for a minor would be given.2 4
The two instructions describe two separate ways a defendant can be relieved of
liability. The first is that no duty of care to the child existed and the second is that
the child breached his duty of care by not meeting the standard of conduct for
minors. Thus, the instructions are not duplicative. Finally, the attractive nuisance
instruction does not overlap with the comparative negligence instructions, which
address the apportionment of damages given a finding of negligence, that is, a
breach of duty.215 Thus, there is no potential for overemphasis to the jury and the
Torres analysis indicates that, like the rescue doctrine, the attractive nuisance
doctrine would be retained for the purpose of determining duty.
B. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the fact finder to infer a defendant's
negligence based on circumstantial evidence.2" 6 Application of the doctrine is
typically conditioned on the event (1) being of a kind that ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence, (2) being caused by an agency or
instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) not being due
to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.2" 7 New Mexico
has traditionally considered the first two elements as comprising res ipsa loquitur,
the third being subsumed under contributory negligence.2 1 New Mexico has not
ruled on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the context of a
plaintiff's comparative negligence.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See N.M. U.J.I. Crv. 13-1312; Schleft, 109 N.M. at 274,784 P.2d at 1017.
See N.M. U.J.I. Civ. 13-1312.
See itL 13-1305.
See id. 13-1312 (bracketed words in original).
See id. 13-1605; supra part l1l.
See id. 13-2218 to 13-2220.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 122, § 328D; N.M. U.J.I. CIV. 13-1623, 13-1420.
See KEEroN ET AL., supranote 61, § 39, at 244. In New Mexico, the requirement of "exclusive control"

has been changed to "management and control." See Trujeque v. Serv. Merchandise Co., 117 N.M. 388, 393,872
P.2d 361, 366 (1994); N.M. U.J.1. CIV. 13-1623 cmt.
218. See Archibeque v. Homrich, 88 N.M. 527, 531,543 P.2d 820, 824 (1975). The third element has not
been resurrected with the adoption of comparative negligence. See N.M. UJ.I. Civ. 13-1623.
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A Torres analysis would first determine that the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine, by its
very nature, facilitates a plaintiffs recovery by allowing him to use circumstantial
evidence to meet his burden of proof. Because it facilitates, rather than prohibits,
a plaintiffs recovery, the doctrine is almost the antithesis of contributory
negligence. Even so, comparative negligence does not serve an evidentiary function
as does circumstantial evidence; thus, the doctrines do not have the same purpose
and the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine may apply under comparative negligence.
Despite the intrinsic ameliorative nature of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the
requirement that the defendant must be in control of the cause of harm for res ipsa
loquitur to apply has overtones of contributory negligence because the control
requirement implies that the plaintiff must not be responsible. However, New
Mexico's requirement is that the defendant "manage and control" rather than
"exclusively control" the harm-causing instrumentality or occurrence. 219 As such,
the requirement allows for some negligence by either a plaintiff or another
defendant. Indeed, in Tipton v. Texaco, Inc.,' where the New Mexico Supreme
Court addressed procedural aspects of the adoption of comparative negligence,2 2
the court stated that "[t]he mere existence of concurrent negligence does not
preclude a particular finding of negligence of one or more tortfeasors through
reliance on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. "2 In discussing the existence of
concurrent negligence, the Tipton court specifically pointed out that a plaintiff's
negligence would not bar his recovery under res ipsa loquitur 223 and to bar a
plaintiff s recovery would be in "direct contravention of the concept of comparative
negligence." 22' Thus, under Torres, New Mexico's res ipsa loquiturrequirements
would need no change with regard to a plaintiff's negligence to be compatible with
comparative negligence.
Torres' second criteria, which analyzes the impact of extra jury instructions
related to the doctrine, favors retaining the doctrine. In order to infer negligence of
219. See N.M. U.J.L Civ. 13-1623.
220. 103 N.M. 689, 712 P.2d 1351 (1985).
221. See Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 103 N.M.689, 696-97, 712 P.2d 1351,1358-59 (1985) (holding that the
adoption of comparative negligence justified liberal third-party pleading). The court determined that the res ipsa
loquitur instruction should not have been given because the doctrine was not the plaintiff's only recourse. See id.
at 698, 712 P.2d at 1360.

222. Id at 697, 712 P.2d at 1359.
223. See id. at 697, 712 P.2d at 1359.

224. Id. at 697,712 P.2d at 1359 (citing Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66,70 (Colo. 1980)).
The Tipton court also touched on another issue, that of whether the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine is compatible with

comparative negligence and several liability where there is third party negligence. The court noted that negligence
by a party other than the defendant does not preclude the requisite control for liability and stated: "The analysis,

from the viewpoint of comparative negligence, focuses on whether a 'defendant's inferred negligence was, more
probably than not a cause of the injury.., though plaintiff's [or third-party's] negligent acts or omissions may also
have contributed to the injury."' Id. (citations omitted). Indeed, in most jurisdictions with comparative negligence,
the plaintiff need not be free of fault to utilize res ipsa loquitur.See Foster v. City of Keyser, 501 S.E.2d 165, 182
(W. Va. 1997) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D, which requires in part that the conduct
of the plaintiff and third persons be sufficiently eliminated by the evidence to infer a defendant's negligence caused
a plaintiff's harm). For example, in Harmon v. Koch, 942 P.2d 669, 673 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997), the Kansas Court
of Appeals modified the requirement that the plaintiff not be contributorily negligent to "incorporate the relevant
comparative negligence principles." Also, the Arizona Court of Appeals has held that a plaintiffneed not show that
the accident was not caused by any voluntary action on her part to gain the benefit of res ipsa loquitur.See Cox
v. May Dep't Store Co., 903 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (noting numerous jurisdictions that support

the court's position, including New Mexico).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

the person or entity in control of the occurrence causing injury or damage, the res
ipsa loquitur instruction requires that (1) the injury or damage be proximately
caused by the occurrence, and (2) the occurrence be of a kind that does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence." The instruction simply provides a
framework for inferring negligence. 2" A comparative negligence instruction, which
would be given in addition to the res ipsa loquitur instruction, would address the
227
apportionment of damages given a finding of negligence under res ipsa loquitur.
Thus, there would be no redundancy in giving the res ipsa loquitur instruction.
Under Torres, then, the future existence of res ipsa loquiturin New Mexico's
comparative negligence scheme hinges on whether the control requirement implies
that the plaintiff must not be negligent. New Mexico's modified requirement and
the dicta in Tipton strongly indicate that the court would ensure that a plaintiff's
negligence would not bar recovery and find res ipsa loquiturcompatible with both
comparative negligence and several liability.
C. Momentaryforgefulness or distractingcircumstances
The distracting circumstances doctrine excuses "a plaintiff's inattentiveness to
obvious dangers." 2 Similarly, the doctrine of momentary forgetfulness excuses "a
plaintiff's negligence when he momentarily forgot known dangers to which he had
voluntarily exposed himself." 29 Courts have applied the doctrines most often to
lessen the harsh effects of contributory negligence, but also have applied them to
a defendant's negligence.'
A Torres analysis suggests that these doctrines have characteristics similar to
those of the sudden emergency doctrine and like that doctrine, New Mexico would
not endorse their use under comparative negligence. Because the doctrines have
been used primarily to avoid contributory negligence, like the now-abolished
sudden emergency doctrine, Torres suggests that they are not needed under
comparative negligence. 3 ' Torres also suggests that separate instructions on these
doctrines would overemphasize a defendant's attempts to shift fault and would
confuse the jury. The overemphasis would arise because "distracting
circumstances" and "momentary forgetfulness" would be addressed in the
instruction on whether ordinary care has been used, which considers the conduct in
' The New
question "in the light of all the surrounding circumstances." 232
Mexico
Supreme3Court eliminated the sudden emergency doctrine for precisely the same
23
reason.

These doctrines have not been adopted in New Mexico, and the analysis could
be used to constrain their judicial adoption. New Mexico has upheld submission of

225. See N.M. U.J.1. Civ. 13-1623.
226. See Strong v. Shaw, 96 N.M. 281,283,629 P.2d 784,786 (Ct. App. 1980) (stating that res ipsaloquitur
"is a rule of evidence ....Its sole function is to supply inferences from which negligent conduct can be found").

227. See N.M. U.J.I. Cv. 13-2218 to 13-2220.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Harfield v. Tate, 598 N.W.2d 840, 842-43 (N.D. 1999).

lId
See id at 843 n. 1.
However, in North Dakota, both doctrines have been retained. See id at 843.

232. N.M. U.J.I. CIv. 13-1603.

233. See Dunleavy v. Miller, 116 N.M. 353, 357, 862 P.2d 1212, 1216 (1993).
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the comparative negligence instruction in cases that involve a plaintiff's distraction
or forgetfulness where there was no separate instruction on the distraction or
forgetfulness.234 The Torres analysis suggests that New Mexico courts will'not be
recognizing the distracting circumstances and momentary forgetfulness doctrines
in the future.
In summary, the Torres analysis implies that in the future, New Mexico may
retain the attractive nuisance doctrine and the res ipsa loquiturdoctrine, and refrain
from adopting the momentary forgetfulness or distracting circumstances doctrines.
Torres suggests that New Mexico would likely find no need to modify the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine to ensure that a plaintiff's negligence would not bar recovery,
consistent with Torres and New Mexico's development of tort law since abolishing
contributory negligence.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Torres decision eliminated independent intervening cause for multiple acts
of negligence, " 5 expressly limiting its holding to negligent acts or omissions by a
third party or the plaintiff that are causes in fact of the plaintiff's injury.' The
court did not extend its analysis to intentional tortious or criminal acts or forces of
nature, so the doctrine of independent intervening cause remains in our
jurisprudence for such situations. 7 The applicability of Torres to concurrent versus
subsequent tortfeasor situations remains to be seen.
The Torres decision was a logical progression in New Mexico's jurisprudence
under comparative negligence and may prove useful in predicting a change in
existing doctrine or a judicial constraint in adopting doctrine in the future.
CYNTHIA LOEHR

234. See Laimkin v. Garcia, 106 N.M. 60,62, 738 P.2d 932, 935 (Ct. App. 1987). A plaintiff's distraction
or forgetfulness might be related to whether he observes an open and obvious danger, which is not a defense in New
Mexico. See Klopp v. Wackenhut Corp., 113 N.M. 153, 157, 824 P.2d 293, 297 (1992). The requirement that an

invitee exercise reasonable care in such a situation has been abrogated as well. See cases cited supra note 69 and
accompanying
235. See
236. See
237. See

text.
Torres v. El Paso Electric Co., 127 N.M. 729, 738, 987 P.2d 386, 395 (1999).
id. at 736,987 P.2d at 393 n.2.
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